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ABSTRACT 
This paper is part of a continuing program of work by the authors on the 
administrative history and practices of the Hunter District Water Board 
which is one of the principal statutory authorities in New South Wales. 
The program has been generously assisted by the Board. The centre piece 
of this series is a comprehensive administrative history of the Board since 
its establishment in 1892, scheduled for publication in 1989. An 
associated series of papers will cover a range of issues related to this core 
study. This paper deals with questions of industrial organisation and 
work practices. Companion papers will cover the Board's relationship 
with trade, unions, its pricing policies, and its attitudes to major industrial 
consumers such as BHP. 
'Industrial Organisation' analyses questions of work practice and rituals 
in the day-to-day administration of the Board. It argues that patronage 
has been a major distorting influence in the organisation of the Board and 
that the structure created to justify patronage appointments has had a 
lasting negative impact. After briefly reviewing the history of the 
Board's creation, the paper examines the divisional structure, the use of 
temporary staff, the seniority system, the tensions between engineers and 
clerks, work practice infringements, efficiency and organisational 
culture. 
The paper concludes that statutory independence is a fiction useful for 
Ministers to be able to claim the credits and dodge the brickbats. The 
paper serves to illustrate how and why industrial relations within public 
sector authorities differ from, yet are similar to, those in the larger 
private sector. 
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INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION: 
Work Practices & Rituals in the Hunter District Water Boardl 
Introduction 
P .N. Troy and CJ. Lloyd 
Urban Research Unit 
The Hunter District Water Supply and Sewerage Board, later the Hunter 
District Water Board2, was created in 1892 because of the failure of local 
government in the region to discharge its responsibilities to provide a 
reliable supply of potable water. It took over the water supply scheme 
built by the Department of Public Works (PWD) to the design of William 
Clark, an English consulting engineer retained by the NSW government in 
1877 to advise on the development of a water supply scheme for the 
Lower Hunter region. Construction commenced in 1879 and the system 
supplied water to local authorities for distribution in 1885. The 
government was anxious for local citizens to accept responsibility for 
managing and paying for their own water. In its structure and functions 
the Board was modelled on the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and 
Drainage Board (MWSDB) which also took over from local government 
the hydraulic services for metropolitan Sydney. 
From the beginning there was considerable ambivalence about the nature 
of the Board. Its founding officers wanted the protection, status and 
conditions of employment of public servants, yet they sought the 
operational freedoms and independence of a statutory authority. The 
Board's support during these early years for its officers' quest to be 
1 We would like to thank the Hunter District Water Board for their support of this 
Project. Alan Bradley and Shelley Schreiner in their different ways made the exercise 
feasible and for this we acknowledge our debt. Chris Fisher and Rosemary Pringle 
provided useful comment on an earlier draft of the paper. 
2 References to 'the Board' are often confusing.· The context, inflection and emphasis 
in the written and spoken word all provide clues to which meaning is being invoked. 
'The Board" has several meanings for officialdom, the public and private interest and 
for its own employees. It may refer to the legal identity, the corporate body defmed in 
the Act and having eight members. It may mean the senior management, the whole of 
the Salaried Division or the entire organisation. At times, the definition employed may 
be ambiguous or multiple. 
brought under the Public Service Act was a measure of its naivete, 
showing no understanding of the political instability which existed in 
NSW State Government until early in the twentieth century. 
Administratively, the task was clear. The Board had to operate an 
inherited system, accept extehsions to it built by the PWD - including a 
comprehensive sewerage system, regulate the conditions under which 
water was supplied to consumers, and collect the rates and charges levied 
by it for that supply. The responsibilities fell broadly into two categories: 
the regulation and provision of 'engineering' functions, and the 
assessment and collection of revenue. Ever since, these responsibilities 
have been run separately, and not as an integrated, or even a dual, 
organisation. This structural division of responsibility has been 
accompanied by dissonance between the two sides. The Secretary was 
responsible for the administrative and clerical functions, the Chief 
Engineer for ensuring that the supply of potable water was maintained 
and, after 1908, for the operation of the sewerage system. 
The administrative and clerical functions of the Board were relatively 
straightforward and presented few opportunities for growth other than by 
an increase in the number of properties serviced. These functions were 
largely routine. Properties which could be connected to a sewer and/or 
water supply were assessed in value and rated, the accounts were rendered 
and revenue collected. Essentially, the administrative functions were 
conceived in a manner providing little professional or intellectual 
challenge. In compensation, an authoritarian, hierarchic regime was 
created. Few white collar jobs were available in the Hunter region. The 
importance of providing services fundamental to public health was 
recognised and emphasised, and the rewards of public service were well 
known. Consequently, employment with the Board's administration was 
highly prized and even prestigious. 
By comparison, the 'engineering' functions had greater opportunity for 
expansion. Initially, all of the ·Board's construction was done by the 
Public Works Department (PWD) which decided what, when and where 
facilities would be built. It then handed them over to be operated and 
maintained by the Board. This constraint was resented by the Board's 
engineers and it created many inefficiencies. It was not possible to defme 
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precisely the boundary between the responsibility of the PWD and that of 
the Board. As the service gradually expanded and required maintenence, 
minor repair and remedial extension the Board accumulated more 
engineering responsibility. This incremental increase in engineering 
functions was facilitated because apart from the foundation President, 
Alexander Brown, all Presidents from 1892 to 1938 were resident PWD 
engineers who 'ran' the Board as one of their local duties. The PWD, 
which had a wide range of responsibilities in the region, could act as the 
backstop until the Board was big enough to accept wider responsibility. 
Increasing demand, growing concern about reliability in supply from the 
original plant, and complaints about water quality forced the Board to 
investigate additional, and alternative, sources of supply. 
Pumping of water from the initial Walka plant to the various service 
reservoirs, its reticulation to properties and the operation of a sewerage 
system were routine matters which provided little challenge for the 
Board's engineering staff. The engineering services, however, were 
essential and continuing while the administration was not. Provision of a 
free service might have eliminated most of the administrative and clerical 
functions but engineering functions would still have been necessary. An 
administratively different organisation would have developed if the 
government had decided to fmance the provision of hydraulic services by 
simply introducing a surcharge on the rates collected by the local 
governments provided with the services. There would then have been no 
need for the rating and many of the accounting functions which the Board 
discharged. 
One of the principal reasons statutory authorities were created in New 
South Wales was a belief that they reduced the opportunities for Ministers 
to exercise patronage and engage in corrupt practices. The creation of the 
Board does not seem to have inhibited Ministers, with regard to 
patronage, at least. Technically, the Board was responsible for recruiting 
staff and deciding on their remuneration. In practice, the Minister for 
Public Works, William Lyne, exercised· great influence in these matters. 
Lyne's first act of patronage was to appoint Alexander Brown, a local 
businessman, as President of the Board. Brown was a close associate of 
the serving Premier, George Dibbs, whose debts he was reputed to have 
paid when the latter was imprisoned some years before. Brown had served 
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as member for Newcastle in the Legislative Assembly from 1889 to 1891, 
when he was defeated, and from August 1892 to 1926, he sat in the 
Legislative Council. The appointment of 'Dibbs' poodle' as President 
drew frequent criticism from other members of the Legislative Assembly. 
Brown served as President until 1896, his departure not rating even a 
mention in the Board's Minutes. 
Board Structure 
Historical Antecedents 
The new Board held its first meeting at llam on July 11 1892. H.D. 
Walsh, the local PWD engineer and Board member, agreed to provide 
services until the Board appointed its own staff. The organisational 
structure and level of salary for the senior officers of the Board proposed 
by the Minister was generous. The man selected by the Minister to be 
transferred from the Public Works Department to become the first 
Secretary of the Board fell ill and was not confirmed in office, allowing 
Brown to nominate a local man, Alfred E. Fry, then 25, to the position. 
Although the Board first discussed Fry at its meeting of 12 August 1892 
· · and did not decide until 20 August, his appointment was backdated until 
r~ugust., the official starting date for others who had been chosen by the 
Board and the Acting Secretary. The appointment of the obviously junior 
and inexperienced Fry· on a salary of £350 per annum was justified on the 
grounds that itwould save £450 per annum (how was never made clear) 
and that he would be able to serve both as Secretary and Accountant, 
positions which Lyne had determined should be separate. Fry's 
benefactor, Brown, for whom he had worked for ten years, sought the 
high salary to preserve another anomaly because the Minister had insisted 
thatthf< Board appoint Joseph Graham O'Connor as Chief Clerk at a salary 
of £300. · The Board had proposed that O'Connor be paid £250 per annum 
and protested against Lyrie's decision. This meant that, given the Public 
Service conventions, Fry as the senior administrative officer had to be 
paid more. 
The reasons for O'Connor's appointment are now obscure but it is clear 
that the appointment was secured by his friends. He had briefly served as 
a member of the Legislative Assembly in 1873n4, had twice been 
declared bankrupt (1876 and 1890) and held the favour of Dibbs, Lyne, 
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and Brown. Much of the criticism of the Board which led to the .1897 
Royal Commission into its management, although couched in terms of the 
Board being overmanned and its staff overpaid was directed at O'Connor 
and his high salary. Although the Commission recommended this be cut 
from £300 to £200, it concluded that he 'carried out his work in a 
satisfactory manner'. Part of the criticism of O'Connor was prompted by 
his avid Catholicism (he was a prolific writer of devotional literature), but 
most was due to the generous patronage he enjoyed at the expense of the 
rate payers. O'Connor remained as an officer of the Board until 1909, 
retiring at the age of 70. Other curious appointments made on Fry's 
recommendation were those of James Pritchard who was appointed in 
October 1892, aged 63, and served until1908 when he was 79 and Edwin 
Thomas who was appointed in August 1892, aged 49, and served until he 
was 67. They were also given generous sick leave. The appointments 
were curious because of advanced age, lack of special skills and, unlike 
other staff, retention past 60, the 'normal' retirement age for public 
appointees at that time. Fry, O'Connor, Pritchard and Thomas were early 
examples of the exercise of patronage in making appointments to the 
Board's administrative staff. Many contemporary problems of the Board 
originated in these patronage decisions, the precedents they provided and 
the organisational structure created to validate them. 
Joshua Henson, 35, took up the position of Board Engineer on the first of 
August 1892 when the Board had a total staff of 29. Nineteen of them had 
been transferred a month earlier from the PWD where they ran the water 
supply system and they lost entitlements under the Public Service Act, so 
they were keen to return to its protection. This little group set out to take 
over, operate, administer and extend the water supply system which had 
been built by the PWD under Vice President Walsh's supervision. They 
were an enthusiastic band committed to the ideals summarised in the 
Board's motto 'Pro Sanitate Civium'. 
Henson was in a difficult position. Tire first Vice President was H.D. 
Walsh who became the second President (serving from 1986 untill901 
when he resigned to take up the position of Engineer to the metropolitan 
Harbour Trust). Walsh was the local senior engineer for the Public 
Works Department which was the constructing authority for all the 
Board's systems. This meant the President could always second guess and 
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'pull rank' on the Board's Engineer. All Presidents were in this situation 
until the reconstruction of the Board in 1938. The initial patronage 
appointments of Fry and 9'Connor, in particular, had the effect of 
bolstering the salaries of the top administrative positions, creating in 
bureaucratic power terms a top-heavy administrative structure. The 
combined effect of the President's downgrading of the Board Engineer's 
role and the relative upgrading of the administrative structure created a 
management structure and style which were unusual for an engineering 
service authority. Brown, although not an engineer, had recognised the 
need for good engineering advice, and the importance of the engineering 
functions in the administrative hierarchy. The reduction of the 
Engineer's role after his departure sparked defensive attempts to sharply 
defme the boundaries of responsibility between 'the engineers' and 'the 
clerks', and also led to several attempts to reduce the Engineers salary. 
This unfortunate division was facilitated by the Public Service Act and 
was common to many areas of administration. Every act perceived by the 
engineering staff as an intrusion by the clerks into their domain was 
resisted, heightening the tension between the two groups. It also helps to 
explain why the Board's administrative style became excessively 
concerned with rules and procedures, and oriented to accounting. 
The 'style' of the organisation significantly influenced the way it 
functioned. Fry, Secretary from 1892 to 1932, and C.G. Schroder, 
President from 1938 to 1952, were strong autocrats who maintained rigid 
hierarchies. They seem to have subscibed to what Lockwood identified as 
"the clerical notion of gentlemanly behaviour, at least in its lower middle 
class admixture with respectability" (1966: 29), requiring top class high 
behaviour on and off the job. Under later Presidents, the regimes broke 
down until the present where a middle level officer was able to say that the 
prevailing attitude was "/don't care what you do as long as I don't get into 
trouble for it." 
Divisional Structure 
Employees of the Board are classified in two categories: the Salaried 
Division and the Wages Division. The Officers of the Salaried Division 
constitute the management of the Board. They are sub.-categorised in four 
divisions: Professional, Engineers, Administrative and Clerical, and 
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General.3 The Wages Division includes all those employees who actually 
dig the trenches, lay the pipes, build the plant, maintain the pumps, clean 
the drains, operate the system, provide the emergency services and ensure 
that water of the highest possible quality at the correct pressure is 
available. 
The language used to describe staff in each Division reflects and 
reinforces the difference in attitude. Staff in the Salaried Division are 
called 'Officers', while those in the Wages Division (formerly the Manual 
and Mechanical Division) are called 'employees', or sometimes, 'men·.4 
The nomenclature creates tension between the two Divisions because it 
implies a superior/inferior distinction. It is a middle class/working class 
dichotomy. Most 'Officers' are paid a 'salary' while all 'employees' are 
paid a 'wage'. Salaried staff can contribute to the superannuation fund; 
wages staff can not. In 1971 the Board introduced a Provident Fund with 
the object of providing retirement and/or death and invalidity benefits to 
'employees' and salaried 'Officers' not eligible to contribute to the State 
Superannuation Fund. 
Implicit in the distinction between officers and employees is the notion 
that somehow officers are 'key' staff while employees may be easily 
replaced. This argument is partly valid. The engineers and other senior 
professionals who necessarily require a high level of training are hard to 
replace, while the labourer on a sewer gang may be recruited with relative 
ease. It is difficult, nonetheless, for Wages Division employees who have 
accumulated particular skills and processes to accept that their 
contribution and services can be easily duplicated. They find it difficult to 
accept that they must work for long periods, and then only in certain 
activities, before they will even be considered for permanent 
appointment. Junior clerks with no special talent or qualification, on the 
other hand, may be appointed to the permanent staff and be entitled to 
contribute to superannuation before they reach their majority. Wages 
Division staff resent such a seemingly low valuation of their contribution 
3 To avoid confusion, in this paper upper case 'Division' is used to refer to the 
Salaried and Wages Division, while lower case 'division' is used for the subgroupings 
of the Salaried Division. 
4 A distinction marked by stylistic devices such as using upper case for 'Officers' and 
lower case for 'employees' in Board records. 
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to the efficient running of the Board. They resent what they regard as the 
unfair advantage of Salaried Division staff in terms of employment and 
conditions. This resentment is reflected in their militancy in dealing with 
the Board and its officers. 
From its origins, the Board has had different policies and attitudes to the 
two Divisions and consequently has treated them differently. It has 
recognised that Salaried Division officers need career paths, vacations, 
sick leave, long service leave, proper provision of meal allowances when 
travelling on Board business, support in their personal development, and 
security. Wages Division employees have had to fight to win such 
conditions and concessions from the Board. 
Salaried Division officers had the rights and entitlements of New South 
Wales State public servants when the Board was created. Although denied 
the coverage of the Public Service Act, despite repeated attempts to have 
them brought under it, their salaries and conditions of employment have 
been comparable with those of state public servants throughout the 
Board's history. The 'culture' of the organisation and its work 
environment have, more often than not, been more conservative, lagging 
behind the Public Service. 
The growth in staff numbers is shown in Table 1, listing separately the 
Administrative and Clerical division staff since 1892. Staff records do not 
permit us to identify separately all staff in the Salaried Division, so we 
have grouped the Professional, Engineers and General officers together 
for most analytical purposes. Nor have we been able to disaggregate the 
figures relating to Wages Division employees. 
Temporary Staff 
In almost every year after 1910 the number of staff referred to in the 
official returns and reports is less than the number actually employed. 
The usual explanation is that the official figures relate to the numbers 
occupying authorised permanent positions. In some years there is a large 
discrepancy between the official figure and the actual number providing 
the services. The magnitude of this discrepancy varies according to the 
degree of concern expressed by the government in its directions to the 
Board as to appropriate staffing levels. In the case of the Salaried 
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Division, the discrepancy may be accounted for by the difference between 
those classified as 'permanent' and those classified as 'temporary'. Most 
officers appointed to the Board are required to work for a probationary 
period, after which they may be appointed to the permanent staff. In 
many cases, the Board chose to retain staff as 'temporary' for some years. 
For all operational considerations these officers were permanent but, 
largely to comply with government staffing criteria, they were not 
recorded as such. After three years, temporary officers accrue annual 
leave and other entitlements at the same rate as permanent officers. The 
essential difference between the two categories is that temporary officers 
can be dismissed with relative ease, and, at present, have limited appeal 
rights about promotion. There are, of course, officers and employees 
who have been temporary in the literal sense that they have been taken on 
for a specific short term task or period, leaving when it is finished. 
Only a small proportion of Salaried Division officers are temporary, but 
the reverse is true of the Wages Division where generally 10-15 per cent 
are permanent (although in 1960, 11.7 per cent were permanent rising to 
21.7 per cent in 1969), and the proportion is being reduced. In both 
Divisions, considerable time and energy has been devoted by the 
respective Branches of the Hunter District Water Board Employees 
AssociationS to representation and remonstration with the Board to 
transfer workers from 'temporary' to 'permanent' status. The longest 
continuous period of temporary service for a Wages Division employee 
was a little over 46 years (tending to import a new meaning to the word). 
Many staff in both Divisions served long periods in a temporary capacity 
before their security was assured by promotion to 'permanent' status. 
'Temporary' staff in each Division are treated differently compared with 
the permanent staff. Temporary officers now have basically the same 
entitlements as permanent Officers after three years service, but 
temporary employees for mo~t of the Board's hi~tory have never enjoyed 
the same benefits as permanent employees, regardless of the actual period 
of employment. The discrepancies were huge. In periods when 
temporary employees had no annual leave, permanent employees had two 
5 The Hunter District Water Board Employees Association has two Branches; one for 
the Salaried Division and one for the Wages Division. for most practical purposes, the 
two Branches act as though they are two separate unions. Each sets its own 
membership fees and separately negotiates with the Board. 
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weeks; when they got one week, permanent employees had three. When 
temporary employees got one week's sick leave, permanent employees 
had four; and when temporary employees had no long service leave 
entitlements, permanent employees were entitled to three months after 15 
years' service. This helps explain why the Association makes such 
strenuous efforts to obtain permanent status for.its members because the 
gains from a change of status are significant. Employees granted 
permanent status in 1950 had worked for the Board for an average of 
more than 11 years. 
The conditions which had to be met before a Wages Division employee 
could be transferred to the permanent staff were first codified in 1921. An 
employee had to have five years' continuous service on operation and 
maintenance, could not be over 45 at the date of commencement of such 
service, and must have passed a medical examination, and must have 
qualifications and past good conduct which rendered him, in the opinion 
of the Chief Engineer, eligible for consideration for transfer. (Such 
qualifications include special personal merit, experience and training.) 
Finally, his service, in the opinion of the Chief Engineer, must be 
continuously required in the future. These provisions created 
opportunities for the Chief Engineer to exercise bias in making 
recommendations. There is popular folklore among past and present 
members of the Wages Division that some Chief Engineers discriminated 
against people on religious or political grounds. This is corroborated to 
some degree by the documented evidence of discrimination against an 
employee in 1971 who was alleged to have been a communist. 
In 1927 the Association sought automatic transfer to permanent status for 
anyone who had worked for five years, and again in March 1933 the 
Wages Division branch of the Association claimed that if a man had 
worked five years in the one position and was engaged on maintenance 
work, his employment was of permanent character and he should be so 
regarded. Anomalous situations were created where men working side by 
side were treated differently and this did 'not make for harmonious 
working'. The anomalies largely related to the significantly better annual, 
sick and long service leave enjoyed by permanent staff as compared with 
casual or temporary staff. Anomalies also existed because men engaged on 
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construction would not qualify for permanency unless the Chief Engineer 
could guarantee work for them for at least a year. 
The Association wanted all men to be accorded the same conditions of 
employment, which would have reduced the attractiveness of 
permanency, but it was prepared to concede long service leave 
entitlements in return for the same annual and sick leave. While the Chief 
Engineer, J.M.C. Corlette, opposed the Association's proposed 
innovation in 1933, he pointed out that the Board's policy was paradoxical 
because while the Board retained the more energetic, resourceful and 
capable men in construction, they had less chance of qualifying for 
permanent positions than the less capable who drifted, or were directed, 
into the more routine occupation of maintenance. He also acknowledged 
that 'the difference in privileges is not conducive to contentment' but 
continued to defend the practice on the grounds that similar anomalies 
existed elsewhere. The Chief Engineer reminded the Secretary that 
classifying more employees as permanent would create difficulties if the 
Board was required to cut expenditure. 
Almost every year the Association took up the cases that it considered met 
the Board's criteria for permanency. Even where the men were 
recognised as being very capable and resourceful, and had been 
supervisory for some years, they were refused the transfer in status if they 
were not on 'maintenance' work or failed the medical examination. These 
conditions remained in force until1975 when the Board decided to revise 
them, appointing a committee which had difficulty reaching agreement, 
but the need vanished when the Board effectively removed the attraction 
for permanency by resolving to make no more transfers after 1976 when 
all positions for the Wages Division received common privileges. The 
main advantage of permanency by 1976 related to sick leave provisions. 
The anomaly arose that temporary employees could accumulate and cash 
in their sick leave entitlemen~, but permanent employees could not. 
The Board's managerial reasons for classifying staff as temporary are 
twofold. It is a device frequently used by government departments and 
statutory authorities to obscure the true situation from Ministerial and 
public gaze, and the Board believed that temporary staff give it flexibility 
in administration. In most cases, Ministers have approved the additional 
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staff and have implicitly approved the deception. This practice frequently 
has placed the Board in a difficult situation. The quest for flexiblilty was 
eroded by almost every other management policy and practice, and the 
nature of the Awards and Agreements that the Board reached with its 
Association. The fact that the main use of temporary appointments related 
to Wages Division employees suggests that it was also a device to reinforce 
the class differences betweert the two Divisions. It helped reinforce the 
'them' and 'us' dichotomy identified by Bain (1970). 
Both Salaried Division officers and Wages Division employees were 
concerned to ensure their security and to protect their opportunities for 
promotion. Classification as 'permanent' was the obvious method used to 
increase security. Another was the continuous attempt by both branches 
of the Association to get the Board to agree to increasing degrees of task 
specification. The process was most obvious in the Wages Division where 
the number of categories for which specific pay rates were identified 
grew from 45 in 1917 to 74 in 1922, 105 in1927 and 180 in 1939 before 
falling to 150 in 1984. Often the rates of pay for each job differed by only 
the smallest fraction of a penny per hour. 
The minute differentiation in skills in different jobs and the refusal to 
work in another category simultaneously made it necessary for the Board 
to recognise its employees' skills and to hire the appropriate number of 
'specialists' to be able to function. The introduction of each new 
technology required classification of men for its operation. The Board 
sought flexibility in the deployment of its work force but its refusal to 
give permanency and its general confrontationist attitude ensured an 
industrial climate in which Wages Division employees militantly 
protected their situation. 
In its first Award the Association secured a clause which gave preference 
to its members in employment with the Board. The purpose of the clause 
was to give a modicum of security to its members in the Wages Division 
by ensuring that the Board's casual labouring was given to them. After 
the 1914-18 war ex-servicemen were given preference when the Board 
recruited labour, and they were the last to be dispensed with when the 
Board 'shortened hands'. This policy rankled with the Association which 
in 1926 obtained agreement to modify it so that the principle of 'last to 
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come, first to go' was followed. The Association complained in 1928 that 
the Board was not acting in the spirit of the preference clause of the 
Award when it put on non-union members knowing that it would shortly 
be laying off large numbers of men. The Board responded saying that 
subject to the efficient and expeditious carrying out of its works it 
endeavoured to arrange for continuity of employment. On occasion, the 
Association issued membership tickets to men who had not previously 
worked for the Board, which protested and pointed out that in its 
agreement with the Association, its practice was to give preference to 
Association members 'offering themselves on the job and, for any men 
required when these men have been absorbed, application will be made to 
the nearest Labour Exchange'. 
These are illustrations of the continuing struggle between the Wages 
Division Branch of the Association and the Board. Each was continually 
'trying' the other out. The Association was always trying to gain security 
for its members and to wrest from the Board the power to decide who was 
to be employed; the Board always tried to diminish the power of the 
union. 
Whenever the Board 'shortened hands', as it did in 1928, the Association 
was most vigilant in protecting its members' rights. The Association 
fought for the principle of 'last to come first to go' and wanted this to be 
an invariable rule. The Board was generally prepared to observe the 
principle but maintained that it should only apply in the sections in which 
it was shedding staff. It also refused the Association's request to re-hire 
men in order of their length of service on the grounds that they had to 
choose the most efficient. Early in 1940 the Board restated its policy of 
giving preference to returned servicemen in both the engagement and 
dismissal of employees. Married men with children received the highest 
priority and single men the lowest. 
Another illustration of the Board's view of the dispensibility of Wages 
Division employees occurred in 1943 when it moved to lay off four 
gangers who had been transferred in 1941 to the Salaried Division when 
they were disciplined by the Association.· The Board claimed that it had 
transferred the men from the Wages Division to the Salaried Division 
because it felt that 'men in control of gangs of men should not be in the 
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same union'. The point at issue was that Wages Division Branch of the 
Association took the view that Wages Division staff should not be laid off 
just to create jobs for men from the Salaried Division when jobs were 
being shed, even if the Salaried men had earlier been Wages Division 
employees. They argued further that in calculating seniority the service 
in each Division should be considered separately. The dispute was 
resolved in favour of the Wages Division Branch of the Association with 
the Arbitrator observing that the Board was simply taking an expedient 
position. 
The Seniority System 
The relative seniority of staff was a matter of great importance. In the 
Salaried Division, seniority was established by relative salary whereas in 
the Wages Division relative length of service was the appropriate 
measure. From 1924, seniority was the relevant factor in promoting or 
laying off staff. The rules were reformulated in 1943 and amended in 
1953 when seniority formally was only taken into account in cases of 
equal 'efficiency'. From their induction officers of the Salaried Division 
became aware of the importance of seniority to their future promotion. 
Clerks progressed through a 15-year General Scale and then waited for a 
classified position. When their advancement to senior classified positions 
was under threat from Engineers and Professionals, the Clerks managed 
in 1953 to obtain the Board's agreement to amend the Staff Committee 
rules so that relative seniority for officers would only apply for officers 
of the same division. In spite of the strong commitment to seniority the 
Board was not free of the influence of patronage, favouritism or 
croneyism. On occasion, this was exercised at the highest level. One 
former President openly acknowledged the advantage he received from 
being given preferment in job location, saying that he was 'placed' in 
particular jobs or given tasks to enhance his career opportunities even 
though it generated some resentment among other officers. 
The emphasis given seniority throughout most of the Board's history has 
meant that little attention has been given the concept of 'staff 
development'. Clerks were given some encouragement to undertake 
Technical College courses but until recently there has been no attempt to 
improve the skills of staff members other than the training they receive 
'on the job'. 
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At times the determination to preserve seniority relativities led officers to 
apply for positions for which they they were not suited, and in which they 
had no real interest, so as to preserve their later promotion opportunities. 
It was just such a case which led two officers of the General division to 
appeal to the Crown Employees Appeal Board in 1957 against a colleague 
who, although better qualified, was junior to them but had been appointed 
to a position which had a salary range with annual increments meaning 
that he would pass and eventually outrank them. The Association was 
similarly agitated when the Board sought in 1958 to require academic 
qualifications for clerical positions lower in status than that of Assistant 
Chief Accountant. The Board was trying to upgrade its staff, but the 
Association was worried that people could be appointed to positions 
because of their academic qualifications, gaining seniority over officers 
who were not so qualified but possibly obtaining preferment for 
subsequent positions which did not require academic qualifications. 
In 1976 a position as chauffeur, normally the 'property' of the General 
division and traditionally an avenue of promotion for a Wages Division 
employee, was sought by a clerk who won the position on appeal to the 
Crown Employees Appeal Board on grounds of seniority. The Wages 
Division Branch of the Association felt aggrieved that 'their' job had been 
taken from them. The lack of clarity in specifying the rights of Wages 
Division employees was at the heart of the issue. 
Length of Employment 
Employees often stayed with the Board for long periods, members of 
their family or close relatives often joining or following after. The 
culture of 'service to the community' expressed in the Board's motto has 
always been firmly embedded in the attitudes of staff to their jobs. The 
Board is not unique in this. Adrian (1984) found similar traditions among 
those serving the NSW Board of Fire Commissioners. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that similar traditions ~xist in many fields of public 
service, and this is consistent with the general observation that children 
often follow the occupations of their parents. The Board's record system 
does not permit easy calculation of overall length of service of its 
employees. As we have shown elsewhere, following removal of the 
prohibition against the employment of married women their length of 
service has increased (Troy and Lloyd 1988). 
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Salaried Division 
The Salaried Division comprises officers appointed to one of four 
divisions: Administrative and Clerical, Engineers, Professional, and 
General. 
Administrative and Clerical 
Traditionally, communication between the Board and its staff was through 
tlie Secretary who was the highest ranking Officer in the Administrative 
and Clerical division. Apart from the earliest appointments to senior 
positions in which patronage was evident the Board, especially for its 
clerks, met Weber's criteria for a bureaucratic body (Parsons 1966:333). 
Initial selection and recruitment of young men as junior clerks was on 
merit. Similarly, young women were selected as typists. Secretarial or 
accounting qualifications were required for the most senior classified 
positions in the Administrative and Clerical division. At any time only 15 
to 20 officers held such qualifications in spite of the encouragement given 
them to undertake part-time evening secretarial or accounting courses at 
the Newcastle Technical College. For the most part the training of clerks 
was advanced by promotion through sections of the division. Most clerks 
thus developed an intimate knowledge of the full range of the Board's 
administration. Many included a period as clerk to the Engineering 
division ensuring that they developed familiarity with engineering 
operations - especially of tlie major construction projects. A small 
number of Administrative &rid Clerical division officers took part-time 
studies for degrees at the Uiliversity of Newcastle. 
· The numbers of staff in this division have increased over the Board's 
history. Before 1938, the increase was relatively steady but the 
reconstitution and reorganisation in that year was followed by a 
substantial increase. Part of the increase was to administer the large 
employment program embarked on by the Board in the early 1930s, and 
some of it was to administer war-time construction. The division, 
however, settled down to around 150 officers following the war and did 
not increase substantially until President F.J. Finnan arrived in 1952. 
Under his stewardship the division flourished. Part of the growth in the 
late 1950s was due to the extra administrative staff needed during the 
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construction of the Grahamstown reservoir but its completion was not 
followed by a slimmer administration. 
Recently, the Board liberalised the policy and practices regulating 
assistance for study. Applicants had to be able to demonstrate that their 
proposed course of study was directly relevant to the job they were doing. 
Now, staff from both Divisions can undertake courses leading to formal 
qualifications from accredited tertiary institutions. Applicants may now 
be granted time off for study with the cost of compulsory fees and 
textbooks reimbursed. In partial recognition of the need to upgrade thie 
Administrative and Clerical division, the Board in late-1982 responded to 
an officer's request to attend university full time by introducing a 
cadetship scheme for Administrative and Clerical officers. Its conditions 
were the same as those for engineering cadets. 
Officers of the Administrative and Clerical division have always been 
determined to preserve and enhance their privileges and positions. They 
have been active in the Association and in establishing and defending the 
principle of promotion by seniority. Their access to senior posts has been 
protected by restricting consideration of seniority to those within the 
division and by strong opposition to 'external' appointees. ·Their 
privileges have also been protected by the development of 'boxing-in' 
which isolates specialist officers, especially those in the Professional and 
General divisions, making them ineligible for senior administrative posts. 
By developing an internal labour market the Board management was 
following a strategy which Gospel and Littler (1983: 176) observed had 
'proved decisive for technologically based, large corporations'. Because 
of their multiple, even contradictory, roles as Association activists, rule 
setters, gate keepers and arbiters, they have been able, as a small group 
within the Board, to establish the boundary conditions and administrative 
style under which the Board has been run. 
The avenues of promotion to -the most senior positions in the Board have 
been through the Administrative and Clerical and the Engineers divisions. 
No officers from the Professional or General divisions have been 
appointed to senior posts. More than any other group in the Salaried 
Division, Administrative and Clerical officers have been limited in their 
range of experience and the breadth of their education. The policy of 
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recruiting intelligent juniors who spent their entire working lives in the 
Board unleavened by any other experience, except for the small number 
who took the Accounting and Secretarial courses at the local Technical 
College, hardly kept the Board in the vanguard of contemporary 
administrative practices. Apart from the few who spent periods in the 
armed forces, hardly an approyriate model, none of the senior officers 
have had experience in any other organisation. 
Engineers 
The Board has always needed engineers and from the early days 
developed its own training program. It recruited engineering cadets and 
gave them the grounding to sit for the entrance examinations of the 
appropriate learned society. Successful cadets went on to become 
assistant engineers, a fortunate few advancing to the handful of classified 
engineering positions. As university and institute of technology 
engineering courses became more readily available in the 1950s, the 
cadetship system was replaced by an insistence that young engineers hold a 
recognised tertiary education qualification. To attract graduates of 
quality, the Board offered a premium to those with Honours or an 
additional degree. Those holding the highest engineering positions in the 
Board have mostly been employed by it for the greater part of their 
careers. Since the 1950s, however, engineers in the middle levels have 
moved periodically in search of wider engineering experience. 
Before the engineers were formed into a separate division, there was some 
blurring of the tasks allocated between engineers, engineering assistants 
and draughtsmen. Following the Association of Professional Engineers 
Association's (APEA) cases before the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission in the 1950 and early 1960s, engineers in all authorities were 
anxious to demonstrate their responsibilities and the rigour of their 
training. Consequently, they grew reluctant to allow anyone other than 
fully trained engineers to carry out engineering work. This rigid 
demarcation practice reduced the Board's flexibility. It was, nonetheless, 
a practice rich in precedent in the Board's industrial relations history. 
Numbers in the Engineers division increased slowly over the first 30 
years. With the retirement of J.B. Henson, their numbers quickly trebled 
and remained at that level until the Board's reconstitution in 1938. The 
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greater range of functions necessitated the employment of a large number 
of engineers. The increase in their numbers after 1972 reflects the 
changes resulting from a reorganisation imposed by President Alan 
Carmichael, himself an engineer. 
Relations between the engineering and administrative arms of the Board 
have usually been tense, partly originating with Henson who as a highly-
trained, broadly educated man, felt that he should take precedence over 
Secretary Fry, who was younger, had no special training and was 
appointed ·through patronage. For a few years, Henson received a salary 
higher than Fry, but the Secretary took formal precedence and was the 
only Board officer entitled to attend Board meetings. Fry succeeded in 
getting the Board to award him a salary higher than Henson, but this 
caused so much friction that the parity of salaries was restored in the 
following year. 
The tensions were heightened because for five years Henson was also 
President of the Board's branch of the Public Service Association (PSA). 
This meant that he was frequently on the opposite side to the Secretary on 
professional and industrial matters. Henson earned a reputation for 
empathy with Wages Division (Manual and Mechanical) employees who 
thought him tough but fair, and with whom he had more day-to-day 
contact than did Fry. This had the effect of sharpening differences 
between the two. When Wages Division staff sought an increase in their 
shovel allowance, Henson calculated that it was marginally cheaper to 
provide them with shovels, arguing the principle that manual and 
mechanical employees were entitled to have their job implements 
provided by the Board. He pointed out that clerks did not provide their 
own pens, ink or pencils and that it was illogical to provide picks and crow 
bars but not shovels. Fry behaved in a petty way at times, going to 
extreme lengths to prevent Henson having a Board motor vehicle. Henson 
felt that in making some 'engineering' decisions the Board gave more 
weight to Fry's views than to his, and this aggravated frictions. The 
contrary interests and life styles of the two men brought the tensions into 
high relief. Henson was a strict Methodist who strongly disapproved of 
drinking, racing and gambling, interests which Fry shared with his patron 
Brown and cost him dearly in his retirement. 
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Henson was rebuked by the Board for his behaviour and attitudes, and he 
was reminded that Fry was the senior officer. The clash of personalities 
and different views on the nature of the organisation, particularly the 
respective roles cif Secretary and Chief Engineer, were reflected in 
relations between administrative and clerical officers on one side, and 
engineers and other professional officers on the other. Tensions spilled 
over into union affairs. 
Fry's antagonism to engineers was maintained by later Secretaries and by 
President C.G. Schroder. Apart from a period in the A.I.F., Schroder 
spent his working life with the Board, including terms as Secretary and 
President (1938-1952). Schroder had an irrational, almost obsessive, 
preoccupation with trying to 'best' the engineers and 'put them in their 
place'. His administrative style was direct and he did not shirk 
confrontation, although he disapproved of officers who were offensive or 
hectoring in tone towards wages employees. Schroder made frequent 
'site' inspections without telling Chief Engineer Corlette, and he 
frequently offered gratuitous comment on the way jobs were being run or 
should be run. The engineers resented this intrusion into their domain. 
Schroder did not improve relations when he upbraided an engineer for 
failing to stand when he entered the room, claiming that the engineer 
lacked respect. Senior and middle level clerks were encouraged to find 
ways of putting engineers in their place, poisoning relations between the 
engineering and administrative arms of the Board and provoking the 
engineers to claim that the Board made wrong engineering decisions. 
This open hostility to engineers found expression later in the 1950s and 
1960s in confrontations between Presidents, Secretaries and Chief 
Engineers in front of junior staff which were corrosive to morale. 
Engineers adopted a policy of minimal cooperation with 'the clerks', 
providing them with as little information as possible. Some engineers 
even held the view that the only role for the administration was to collect 
the money needed by engineers to carry out the works. The situation 
deteriorated to the point where engineers determined to 'even the score'. 
They did so in a petty way when an engineer was appointed President, and 
at a ceremony where he opened a reservoir, no administrative officers 
were invited. The appointment of Carmichael returned the Board to the 
situation which applied prior to 1938 when Board presidents were also 
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engineers. President Carmichael involved himself in detailed engineering 
matters to the point where relations with the Chief Engineer became 
stressed and a second Chief Engineer was appointed. 
Professional 
The Professional division includes all groups of employees whose 
members receive some advanced training and who may be admitted to 
appropriate professional bodies if they have appropriate qualifications. It 
encompasses a diverse group of occupations such as chemists, laboratory 
assistants, architects, draughtsmen, librarians, nurses, surveyors, 
computer specialists. The need for such specialised occupations has 
increased as the Board's activities have become more sophisticated. For 
the most part, career opportunities for officers within each of the 
occupations in these ancillary or support groups is severely limited. 
People appointed to one or other position covered by the Professional 
division generally have to find opportunities for advancement in their 
field outside the Board. It is extremely difficult for them to be promoted 
into the Administration and Clerical positions which have paths to the top 
of the organisation. Professional officers have usually been 'boxed in' by 
appointment to a specific position. 
General 
The General division comprises all occupations which provide or 
supervise the technical operations of the Board. Those occupying the 
designated positions in this division mostly have trade qualifications 
obtained through a technical college. Many have worked in the Wages 
Division. 
To some extent, the function of the General division is to provide security 
for selected members of the Wages Division. Appointment of Wages 
Division staff to the General division provides one method of 
incorporation into the ruling stratas of the Board. To the extent that the 
concept of 'key workers' may be applied to the operations of the Board, 
members of the General division earn the description. The original 
organisational structure of the Board did not include a General division 
within the Salaried Division. It was created in 1917 so that the Board 
would have a division, whose members could be called on to operate the 
Board's systems in emergencies. (They have not performed this role in 
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the industrial disputes which have occurred.) The Engineers and the 
General division officers provide the operational control for the Board's 
three main functions of water supply, sewerage and drainage. Without 
their contribution the systems could not be maintained and would quickly 
cease to operate. 
The Board adhered to Weberian notions of bureaucracy for its Salaried 
Division and employed Taylorist notions of scientific management in its 
attitudes to its Wages Division. The creation of the General division is 
consistent with Taylorist notions of the 'structure of control' (Littler 
1978: 193) as is both the careful delineation of the Wages Division and its 
separate conditions of employment. 
Work Practice Infringements 
Proponents of statutory authorities as appropriate vehicles for the 
delivery of public services, such as water supply and sewerage, rarely 
raise problems with work practices or efficiency,yet both are important 
factors. Infringement of of work practice standards in the public and 
private sectors takes many forms. In some cases those are minor and 
regarded as inconsequential or a 'normal' part of the overheads of the 
organisation, such as making private telephone calls in work time, or 
walking out with a pencil, pad or other expendable supply used in the job. 
In others, a blind eye is turned to practices such as driving vehicles home, 
doing 'foreigners' in the workshops, having work done on a senior 
officer's property, inflating the time worked or incorrectly filling in time 
sheets. Others may involve secret commissions such as gifts or contractors 
doing small improvements to the private homes of officers, sometimes 
with the help of more junior employees, sometimes charging it to a 
contract they have or hope to get. In some industries employees feel they 
have a 'right' to help themselves to the product they produce. Often, this is 
recognised by the management who attempt to control it by offering 
employees the product at reduced price. In other cases, the forms involve 
major larceny which is not condoned. 
The two Divisions of the Board have always had opportunities for 
infringing work practice standards, and past management has tended to 
react differently in each case. For example, Salaried Division officers 
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have made private telephone calls while at work, or put a biro and pad in 
their bag and taken them home. In many cases, stationery was used for 
work at night or on a weekend and not returned - usually a simple 
oversight. In the contemporary era, these are not seen as transgressions 
worthy of disciplinary measures. It was not always so. In earlier years, 
officers had to keep a record of all telephone calls, private calls out were 
strongly discouraged and even incoming private calls were frowned on. 
Officers had to produce the stub of a pencil before they were issued with 
another and coloured pencils were especially hard to obtain. The costs of 
controlling the use of such expendable supplies to eliminate petty 
infringement or to use them economically was excessively high, 
presenting endless opportunity for petty tyrannies, and attempts at 
control were quietly dropped. 
Wages Division employees have fewer opportunities to make telephone 
calls or to appropriate expendable supplies. Few of the materials or tools 
they use in their work are easily secreted or domestically useful in small 
quantities and they are probably more closely scrutinised than Salaried 
Division officers. 
The private use of Board vehicles has become a 'perk' of the job, one way 
in which the real income of officers has been kept in line with private 
sector income packages. This practice has developed in many public 
authorities and government departments; it is an informal practice which 
is not closely supervised nor officially condoned. There have been 
expectations that senior officers take advantage of their position to get 
little jobs done and, providing the practice was not excessive, it was 
mostly ignored 
Board staff have sometimes 'borrowed' equipment to undertake private 
work. Mostly the work was completed without incident and the 
equipment returned or replaced, sometimes damaged but without note. 
Occasionally, staff were reprimanded for .the practice. Sometimes, an 
incident such as a motor accident caused unauthorised use of equipment to 
be brought to the management's notice. In those cases, disciplinary action 
and punishment of the offender(s) usually followed. Punishments tended 
to be more severe on members of the Wages Division who were caught 
than members of the Salaried Division. 
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The tradition in some industries that employees have a 'right' to free and 
reduced price products has had its analogue among staff who felt they 
should enjoy free water supplies. Tampering with, adjusting or bypassing 
water meters have been methods of avoiding charges for water: each has 
attracted strong disciplinary action if discovered. 
If detected, major larcenies have always been treated seriously and 
prosecutions and dismissals have followed. Periodically, the management 
felt that the level of petty infringement was unacceptably high and that it 
had to make an 'example' of one or more offenders to warn other staff 
that it was vigilant and expected a high standard of probity. Members of 
the Wages Division regarded this policy of containing infringement. as 
capricious am1 unfair. They resented it when the staff administering the 
censures were known to have enjoyed privileges and considerations closer 
to the bone. None of these infringements have been peculiar to the Board 
or to public authorities. They also exist in private firms, but for some 
reason the public is more agitated when it occurs in public authorities, 
even where a private firm has a monopoly to supply a product or public 
service. 
Falsification of time sheets and absences from the work place have always 
been regarded as reprehensible behaviour and the Board management has 
severely dealt with detected offenders. At least that is the view of Wages 
Division staff who observed what they regard as double standards in the 
correct estimation of work time. Salaried Division officers appear to 
have enjoyed greater flexibility in this respect than Wages Division 
employees. 
Efficiency 
Measures of efficiency are notoriously hard to construct. Where markets 
operate for goods and services the issues are resolved relatively easily but 
in the public sector, where monopoly of service provision is the norm, 
they are not. Measures which reliably disaggregated the costs of annually 
maintaining each service, the costs of adding to each, and the head works 
investment in each would enable comment to be made on the productivity 
of the staff. Because of the extent of mechanisation and automation, and 
the greater sophistication and complexity in contemporary decision 
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making compared with earlier periods, this would be a difficult exercise. 
We are forced by the unsatisfactory nature of the fmancial records to use 
physical output measures. It would be encouraging to report on the 
changes in productivity of each category of staff but the records are not 
organised to allow such analysis. In figures 1 to 4 we show the nature of 
the relationship between the numbers of connections to water and 
sewerage services and the number of staff in various divisions. 
The number of water supply and sewerage connections per capita of 
Administrative and Clerical officers appears to have increased over the 
Board's history (fig.1) suggesting gains to productivity over the period. 
However, when looked at separately we find that there is no evidence of 
increasing productivity in the number of water connections per capita for 
Administrative and Clerical officers (fig. 2) although there appears to be a 
strong and continuing increase in productivity in terms of the numbers of 
sewerage connections per capita. The fact that officers once included in 
this group are now in other divisions and that changes in regulation, 
mechanisation and computerisation have altered or eliminated many 
procedures suggests that much of the increase in productivity is more 
apparent than real. We would expect increasing productivity of staff over 
the early years of the construction of a new system; as maintenance and 
renewal became more important there would be an apparent decline in the 
rate of increase in productivity. The continuous expansion of the system 
has masked these effects and we cannot separately identify them in the 
statistics we have. There appears to be no relationship between the water 
supply and sewerage connections per engineer, nor is there an identifiable 
trend in the amount invested per engineer per annum. 
Organisational Culture 
Staff Differentiation 
The ambivalence of the Board about its staff is richly illustrated in its 
differing attitudes to the Salaried Division officers and Wages Division 
Employees. Since 1917 the Board has usually negotiated Industrial 
Agreements with officers, while employees work under Awards, an 
important distinction. Agreements are concluded where there is a 
congruence of values, attitudes and understandings between management 
and staff reflected in the 'civilised', or consensual, approach to the 
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resolution of differences. The officers can enjoy this 'we, us and Co.' sort 
of relationship because the drawing up of an Industrial Agreement is for 
them a kind of phantasmagoria where they argue the issues among 
themselves in the full knowledge that ultimately they cannot deny 
themselves the benefits they seek. 
The employees on the other hand are 'them' and it is much easier to deny 
their aspirations. (Some officers seem to actually enjoy challenging, 
provoking or denying the employees their claims.) Tactically, even if 
management acknowledges that the employees have a good case which it 
will accept, employees are forced to go through a litigious, 
confrontationist process of preparing and arguing for an Award. This 
keeps employees bound up in a tiresome bureaucratic process which is 
expensive and may also be a device for keeping their ambitions and 
expectations in rein. It also produces a bloody-mindedness on the part of 
the employees who are not encouraged to be charitable, flexible or 
accommodating in their working relationships with the officers of the 
Board. They sense and resent the superior attitudes expressed, and 
greater power exercised, by officers who, in essence, have the same or 
similar class origins. 
The language used by many officers to differentiate between themselves 
and employees of the Wages Division is to refer to 'inside' and 'outside' 
staff. The intention is to differentiate and identify by location of function, 
but a more appropriate meaning is implicit: inside staff are within the pale 
and outside staff are beyond it. Wages Division employees are alive to the 
subtleties in the shades of meaning. In some degree, that is the source of 
their strength. They recognise that they are not part of the establishment; 
that they are not on the inside, and have little chance of getting there and 
so are freed of the inhibitions that prevent officers from acting or 
expressing themselves in ways that might jeopardise their promotion. 
The most obvious difference in the treatment of staff in the two Divisions 
relates to hours of work. Apart from a small number of specialist 
positions, Wages Division employees worked a six-day 48 hour week 
from 1892 to 1926, when the working week was reduced to a five-and-a 
half day 44 hour week from 1926 until 1950. In 1950 the five-day 40 
hour week was introduced generally. Salaried Division officers, 
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however, worked a five-and-a-half day 35 1/2 hour week until1926 when 
the week was reduced to five days. In 1950 the five-day 35 hour week was 
introduced. Lampmen and watchmen worked 56 hours until 1922 when 
their week was reduced to 48 and then to 44 in 1926. In the same period, 
the Board's worked a 36 hour week as did labourers in sewers. 
There has always been a higher degree of flexibility. However, for the 
starting and finishing times of Salaried officers. At times, the Board has 
sought to improve the punctuality of officers, as in 1897 when it 
considered introducing a system of fines for lateness and disciplining 
officers who were repeatedly late. The 1916 General Regulations 
covering the Salaried Division set down the conditions relating to 
irregular attendance and these were later enshrined in the A wards and 
Industrial Agreements covering officers. Much of the authoritarianism of 
the Board in its first 85 years stemmed from a preoccupation by senior 
officers with punctuality. The introduction of staggered working hours in 
1977 greatly reduced this source of administrative tension. 
Employees have never enjoyed these privileges. The shiftwork nature of 
many of the tasks , the need for constant monitoring in some, and the 
interdependency of tasks means that staggered working hours can not be 
so readily applied to employees. Nonetheless , the records suggest that 
supervisors have frequently been excessively zealous in ensuring the 
punctuality of employees, sometimes to the point of creating the 
conditions for industrial disharmony and sometimes behaving in a brutish 
way so as to provoke sackings. 
Leave Entitlement 
Entitlement to annual vacations is now broadly the same for both 
Divisions. Each has had four weeks leave since 1966. Before that, officers 
had three weeks leave. When employees were first given annual leave it 
was called 'Good Conduct' leave. There were many cases when 
management judged an employee not to have been 'good' enough and he 
was denied leave. On occasion employees who took industrial action 
were punished by having their leave withdrawn. The system created 
opportunities for vindictiveness which further underlined the 'them/us' 
divisions. The requirements of 'continuity', 'satisfactory service', 
'loyalty', 'efficiency' and industrial docility were all intended to break the 
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influence of the Association. Regulations gazetted by the Board in 1921 
gave permanent employees annual leave entitlements similar to those of 
Officers. Temporary employees continued to be eligible for 'good 
conduct leave' but were fmally granted one week's annual leave per year 
for the first two years' continuous service and two week's leave for each 
additional years' service in place of good conduct leave in the 1944 
Award. From 1915 employees were allowed to take leave of absence 
owing to the death and funeral !)fa father, mother, brother, sister, wife or 
child. Where the ·employee had annual or good conduct leave due the 
leave of absence could be charged against such entitlement. In 1943 
employees were granted one day in any twelve months for such leave. 
The concession was progressively liberalised to include 'de facto' 
relationships. Officers had always been able to take such compassionate 
leave. 
Provisions for sick leave for staff in the two Divisions also differ. 
Employees who are at most risk of injury and illness, working in the 
sewers and trenches, on the scaffolding or handling noxious chemicals, 
receive less leave compared with officers who work in well lit, safe, 
temperature-controlled environments. Since the Board's inception, 
officers have enjoyed access to sick leave, the duration of which is 
increased with length of service. The precise amount of leave has 
increased slightly over the Board's history and currently is 44 days for up 
to nine years service and 65 for more than nine. Employees have had 
much shorter entitlements. In the early years, employees had no rights 
and depended on the Board's beneficence. The lack of sick leave 
sometimes forced employees to get members of their family to do their 
work fer them as it did in 1906 when caretaker Stanton got his son to do 
his work. The Board initially suspended him for being absent without 
leave but subsequently granted leave when advised that he had been ill. 
The employees at the Walka Pumping Station could usually count on a 
sympathetic response to their plight if they were injured or fell ill but the 
Board was not so humane elsewhere in its operations. Permanent 
employees obtained sick leave entitlements under the 1921 Regulations but 
temporary employees did not do so untill944 when they were given four 
days leave after one year's service. 
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Industrial Negotiations 
Reference has been made to the different attitudes of the Board in its 
approach to negotiations with staff of the two Divisions. The Board is 
more likely to enter negotiations for an Industrial Agreement with the 
Salaried Division than the Wages Division. Important factors of class and 
power may be suggested to explain why this is so. It is extremely difficult, 
if not impossible, for the Board to conduct negotiations with the Salaried 
Division Branch because the officers who have the responsibility to 
conduct such negotiations are themselves members of that Branch of the 
Association. Senior office holders in that Branch often become the 
officers who actually have the responsibility for advising the Board or 
negotiating on the latter's behalf. 
No implication is intended here that breaches of confidentiality have 
occurred or that officers can not be relied on to discharge their duties 
with integrity. The point is more complex: in situations where both sides 
to a negotiation share values and where, ultimately, both may benefit in 
the same way, the side taking initiative and setting the agenda is likely to 
win. If that side takes a series of small steps along the accepted ideological 
path, the probability of winning is increased. This is even more likely to 
eventuate when the outcome of the exchange can not be readily 
challenged, where the costs implicit in decisions may not be made explicit 
or where the parties to the exchange feel that costs can be readily passed 
on. 
Much of the exchange and 'contest' between the Salaried Division Branch 
and the Board fits this description. Initiatives by the Branch on pay and 
conditions have been generally seen by the Board as reasonable. Mostly, 
the initiatives by the Branch have been widely discussed within the 
Division and a consensus has developed about their desirability or 
feasibility long before they are formally codified in logs of claims. 
The increase in the number of classified positions is an interesting 
example of the Salaried Division Branch's conduct of negotiations with 
the Board. In 1922 the Board agreed that the Clerical Division would 
have six classified positions and the General Division eight. By 1938 this 
had reached 12 and 11 and by 1966 it was 41 and 48 respectively. Some of 
the increase can be explained by the increase in staff or the increase in 
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functions, but the greater part is to be explained in the processes by which 
the Salaried Division Branch set out to obtain salary increases for its 
members and exert dominant influence on the Board. The process of 
labelling and classifying positions in the Industrial Agreements and 
Awards is a device for securing positions with salaries above the normal 
range for clerks and others. By elaborating job categorisation and 
specification, a pool of highe'r-paid jobs is created for officers beyond 
their agreed salary scale. Combined with promotion based on seniority, 
almost everyone joining the Salaried Division of the Board and sticking 
with it could anticipate promotion to a comfortable salary level. This 
increase in classified positions was particularly important for the clerks. 
In theory, there was no qualifying period for occupation of the position 
prior to retirement and in practice some occupants held them for very 
brief periods. Promotion to a classified position shortly before retirement 
provided them with increased pension benefits. Recent changes to the 
superannuation scheme link the retirement pension to the averaged salary 
of the officer's f'mal three years in employment. This will reduce the 
number of opportunities for gift promotions. 
The Annual Picnic 
Images of the past glow in the minds of the Board's officers. Fond 
memories are burnished each time the past are recalled. It is spoken of 
nostalgically as an era when 'we were all one big happy family'. Few 
seem aware of the irony. Officers speak about past Annual Picnics andre-
unions as simple occasions of fun and merriment, of comradeship and 
shared ideals. They possessed these qualities only in part . 
The Annual Picnic partly originated in the social clubs and multifarious 
associations of the colony, and in the nmeteenth century custom of owners 
or proprietors of businesses taking all the staff on an annual one-day 
excursion and 'treating' them to an excess of food and drink. The custom 
developed before workers received annual vacations and public holidays. 
It was practised by the more munificent employers for a mixture of 
motives, including self aggrandizement, and was regarded by some as an 
occasion when all members of the firm could share equally in the simple 
pleasures of life. Delgado points out that the 'annual outing' could be 
constricting for the employee. With the boss present "behaviour was 
watched, attitudes observed and taken note of' (1977: 58). The Board was 
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not the same as the firms to which Delgado refers but, undoubtedly, the 
bosses closely observed conduct. 
The first official picnic was held early in 1893 when those 'who could be 
spared' were given permission to attend the Harbours and Rivers 
Department's annual picnic without loss of pay. They were not given 
permission to attend another until 1905 when they were again invited to 
attend a Harbours and Rivers picnic. Only the 'the men' of the Board 
asked for permission to attend and only those who could be spared were 
allowed to go, but without pay. 
Wages Division employees or 'men' were given the right to an Annual 
Picnic Day in their Award of 1917 and have retained it. Those officers 
who could be spared without public inconvenience picnicked at Speers 
Point with their blue collar comrades at the courtesy of the Board in 1922, 
again in 1928 and in many following years, especially since 1950. For 
several years, only those officers who actually purchased a picnic ticket 
had the day off. The picnic was organised by the Wages Division Branch 
of the Association, included a large sporting program and was regarded 
generally as successful. 
In 1942, the Board granted a day off in lieu of the picnic because of the 
war. There was no picnic in 1975 because of an industrial dispute or in 
1978 due to the financial difficulties experienced by the Wages Division 
Branch of the Association. The picnic was held in various places in the 
region but most often at Speers Point. From 1950, the Board allowed the 
use of its motor lorries to transport food and equipment and Board 
members usually donated a trophy for the sports. 
The 'happy' family image of the picnic varies according to the 
perspective. From some accounts of the journeys to and from the picnic 
they were not dissimilar to the boisterous tours of football clubs and only 
slightly less destructive than the European tour of the Huns. Some said it 
was a 'day they could park the wife and kids ·in the shade and shoot up to 
the pub for a drink' before sports. Single men said they often spent much 
of the day in the pub emerging in time for the sports and to dally with the 
young women: the women who recalled the picnic said they must have 
been at another picnic. 
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In retrospect, the picnic has grown in the telling, acquiring all sorts of 
connotations and resonances about romantic encounters and alcohol 
consumption. Some exploits, real or imagined, are now ingrained in the 
mythology of the Board. But the picnic clearly did not live up to the high 
expectations. It may have brought fulfilment in the early part of the 
century when general recreation opportunities were few but it became 
increasingly expensive to organise and was effectively discontinued in 
1982. Presumably the benefits of the fellowship were exceeded by the 
material costs. This fall in popularity of annual picnics was experienced 
by most other clubs and fraternal organisations, particularly trade unions. 
Employees continue to have a Picnic Day holiday because it is in their 
Award. Officers have continued to enjoy this concession from the Board 
although it is not in any of their Awards or Agreements. To some degree, 
this benefit is a measure of the Board's generosity compared with other 
employers. 
Re-union 
From the outset sporting activities have been important in the cultural life 
of the Board's officers. The first recorded sporting activities in the 1894 
season are for the 'Water and Sewerage Board Cricket Club' whose 
Patron was Brown, the President, and whose Vice-Presidents Board 
members. Both the Secretary and Board Engineer played occasionally in 
the 1895 season although neither figured among the team's stars. G.F. 
Beeston, W.P. Rodgers, A. Burke and A. Evans as all rounders were the 
backbone of the team with M.E. Cooke and J. Thompson its star batsmen 
and W. McCue its best bowler. 
The Board's desire to build morale within the Salaried Division and 
maintain good relations with the MWSDB was expressed in the support it 
gave in 1946 to the formation of a Sports Club to engage each Bank 
Holiday in a sports competition and Re-union with the MWSDB sports 
clubs. The HDWB club has comprised mainly officers who were active in 
sport, although a few members no longer play regularly. The club has a 
membership of from 50 to 80. The two clubs take turns to host the annual 
event over a long weekend, involving a visiting team of 50 to 60 and 
including a mixture of business and pleasure. The exchanges involve an 
inspection of some installations and plant of each authority. The pleasure 
is derived from the social events as much as from the sporting exchanges. 
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Many of the HDWB Sports Club officials and activists have also been 
leading figures in the Salaried Division Branch of the Association which 
has always fostered sporting activity, beginning in 1922 with a donation to 
the Board's Swimming Club. The Sports Club is a well organised group 
which has recruited teams in Rugby League football, tennis, table tennis, 
squash, golf and bowls. Occasionally, the Club has included 'outsiders' 
such as Wages Division players to make up a team, especially in Rugby 
League, and on rare occasions it has 'rung in' players from outside the 
Board's employment. 
The Club is fmanced by a regular subscription from its members. One of 
its early attractions was that it gave officers an opportunity for a cheap, if 
brief, holiday, an opportunity to 'get away from the missus and kids for a 
weekend'. The respective authorities allow the participants to travel each 
way in work time so the weekend is stretched. The two authorities make 
substantial contributions to the success of the weekend by picking up some 
of the costs. Usually, they pay the transport of visitors to the Sunday 
outing and contribute to the cost of a meal. In the 1950s, the Club 
competed for a trophy donated by President Frank Finnan of the HDWB. 
More recently, private firms have donated many trophies for the sports 
competitions. The traditional all-male dinner on the Monday night, 
usually attended by senior officers of both Boards, is often characterised 
by bibulous fraternity. 
Over the past decade the Club has discussed whether it should be open to 
women members. In 1986 the HDWB Sports Club decided to have two 
clubs - one for men and one for women - which would run separate 
competitions. The MWSDB President, Dr. Rhonda Mcivor, held that the 
Club should be open to both men and women and largely for that reason, 
the 1985 competition fell through. Including women in the exchange 
would require more organisation and would change the traditional 
character of the event. Some of the members were apprehensive that if 
women are admitted they would have to t~e their wives on the visit to 
Sydney. 
There are suspicions that the Sports Club is a separate 'faction' within the 
Salaried Division, assisting the careers and advancement of members. It 
is always difficult to identify cause and effect in these aspects of an 
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institution's life. Any advancement members enjoy may come simply 
because they are active people for whom Sports Club membership 
provides an outlet among people with whom they share many values and 
interests. Their 'advancement' may simply reflect the valuation of these 
attributes by the Board and their Sports Club membership is coincidental. 
Encouraging women to join the Sports Club could reduce the suspicion 
that members enjoy preferment and demonstrate that the Board is a 
serious equal opportunity employer. 
Comment 
We have shown how patronage, which statutory authorities were partly 
designed to avoid, substantially distorted the initial staffing of a particular 
statutory authority, and had continuing impact on its organisational 
structure. Attempts to eliminate patronage often lead to codification of 
appointment and promotion guidelines. In our example, this produced 
promotion by strict seniority leadin in tum to the loss of good staff and 
dampened interest, lack of initiative and reduced enthusiasm among those 
who remained. Although the HDWB had clear 'engineering' obligations 
and responsibilities it was, in effect, run by clerks with a relatively 
narrow range of skills and mediocre education but who convincingly won 
the struggle for power. 
Another major reason for creating statutory authorities was that they 
were independent to a large degree. The history of the Board indicates 
that this independence is, and always has been, more apparent than real. 
When it has suited the Ministers and Heads of Government Departments 
like Works, Treasury and Premier's, they have claimed that the 
authorities were independent. At other times, they have not hesitated to 
issue directions or make ex cathedra pronouncements, expecting and 
receiving automatic compliance. The Board itself has behaved 
ambivalently, at times behaving as though it accepted and believed the 
rhetoric of independence, at others times behaving as though it were 
subordinate. 
The language used about and by the Board has contributed to the 
confusion. Periodically, as in the Industrial Court, it has been reminded 
of its independent legal identity yet in the same counsels it has been 
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referred to as a Department of Government. The Board itself has sought 
coverage by the Public Service Act and also to emphasise its uniqueness 
and separation from the rest of the state administration. No President or 
Board has felt strong enough to tell any Minister to whom it reported that 
they would follow a course different from what the Minister wished. 
The value of the device or fiction of statutory independence is that 
Ministers, Presidents and Boards have been able to have their cake and eat 
it too. They have created the ultimate device in that they each seem to 
have the ability to claim the credits and dodge the brickbats. The 
population of the Hunter who pay for the cake have never really had the 
opportunity to express a view on what sort or how big a cake they want. 
But they do not seem overly concerned. 
Our study reveals something about the manufacture of class and class 
relations. In the HDWB, the cleavage was made conveniently on a white 
collar/blue collar basis and,in essence confirmed the division which Bain 
(1970) found in the operation of an industrial enterprise. It serves to 
illustrate how and why industrial relations within public sector authorities 
differ from, yet are similar to, those in the larger private sector. 
35 
Abbreviations 
AIF 
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Association 
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MWSDB 
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TABLE 1: Staff Numbers in Each Division 
Salaried Division 
Year Admin& Profes- Engineers General Prof, Eng Total Wages Total 
Oerical sional &General Salaried Division 
Division 
1892 14 0 1 5 6 20 16 36 
1897 17 1 1 5 7 24 20 44 
1902 20 2 1 5 8 28 26 54 
1907 24 2 1 8 11 35 34 69 
1912 59 9 3 9 21 80 53 133 
w 1917 81 12 4 17 33 114 64 178 
00 1922 84 9 4 23 36 120 74 194 
1927 118 9 14 32 55 173 111 284 
1932 114 6 12 29 47 161 110 211 
1937 112 6 11 31 48 161 110 276 
1942* 216 80 296 952 1,248 
1947* 157 86 243 478 721 
1952* 156 99 255 514 769 
1957* 175 - 134 309 807 1,116 
1962* 219 162 381 1,168 1,549 
1967* 224 211 435 926 1,361 
1972 232 115 49 113 297 529 948 1,477 
1977 235 134 77 135 346 582 942 1,523 
1982 263 154 77 155 386 649 915 1,564 
1984 262 171 74 170 415 679 856 1,535 
*There was no disaggregation of staff members in the Professional, Engineers & General division in this period. 
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